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Abstract. The aim of this paper is to propose a theoretical reflection on the possible 
transformations of democracy in globalized societies. In this direction, the Author outlines the 
classical approaches to the analysis of democracy and then proposes a criticism of the static 
picture offered by the liberal conception. In the wake of Charles Tilly, a process-oriented and 
dynamic conception is proposed, by declining democracy in terms of democratization (and 
potential de-democratization). In this paper the different theoretical challenges to liberal 
democracy are also proposed, starting from the participatory conception that assumes the core of 
the democratic political process in contentious action of organized civil society. Special attention 
is also paid to the challenge of deliberative democracy in its two versions, liberal and deliberative. 
The paper then tries to figure out how to adapt these theoretical proposals to the new conditions of 
trans-local societies, from a rethinking of the concept of democratic citizenship in a post-national 
key. The paper ends with a reflection on cosmopolitan democracy and the opportunities offered by 
the major challenge of rethinking global governance in a democratic and participatory way. 
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1. Democracy and Globalization 
Reasoning about “democracy today” requires a reflection on that process of 
substantial transnationalization of social, political and economic dimensions that 
has long been baptized with the name of globalization. This process inevitably 
involves changes in the way in which "politics" and "democracy" have been 
conceived, with obvious repercussions on the very concept of democratic 
citizenship that was originally configured in the historical dimension of the 
nation-state. The growing interdependence of social processes and trans-national 
mobility of goods, services and humans involve a rethinking of the concept of 
politics as well as a not only theoretical reconfiguration of the governance at a 
supra- and sub-national scale. Before starting with our reflections, we need to 
specify what we mean, in this context, by globalization, which constitutes the 
social framework of these new configurations. 
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By "globalization" we mean the process of social structuring of a world 
system in which no event is absolutely isolated and circumscribed to a single geo-
political area. Even those processes that originate at the local level can determine 
effects on the normal course of events in other local systems. But we have 
witnessed a disproportionate use of that term. Globalization is in fact long been 
the subject of debate among politicians and mass media, attracting at times an 
apocalyptic attention and at times an apologetic attention. As Khondker and 
Robertson write (1998, 26), the situation of globalization is a typical example of 
how concepts and theories are developed in scientific contexts to be later used in 
the “real world” in a way that ends up endangering their analytical capacity. So 
the concept of globalization takes on a pejorative or ameliorative character 
depending on the convenience. In this paper, drawing only in part on the 
analytical effort of Beck (2000), we should at least distinguish between 
globalization and globalism (Engelen et al., 2011; de Nardis, Salento 2013): 
By “globalization” we mean the process through which single national 
sovereignties are differently affected mainly by transnational economic – but also 
political and cultural – actors, or simply by men and women who, although having 
a territorial entity as a stable reference, act and think globally, thus contributing to 
the determination of a growing interdependence between States and national 
societies. "Globalism", on the other hand, refers to the process of development of 
a global market that removes and therefore replaces the political action of the 
states, in the name of a neo-liberal ideology grounded in the idea of the 
dominance of economics over politics. Through this dominance, the 
multidimensionality of globalization is associated only with the economic and 
financial dimension, resulting in a totalizing ideology that removes the most 
important distinction of the modern era, namely, the distinction between 
economics and politics articulated in the form of economic power and political 
power. According to the dictates of globalism we are witnessing an economy that 
outsources production processes and creates capital through a radical 
financialization vis-a-vis the increasing inability of politics to regulate the routes 
of the economy. Financialization and de-politicization of the economy are, 
therefore the most obvious effects of globalism. 
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From this emerges the irreversible nature of the coexistence of different 
particular (economic, political, ecological, cultural, etc.) logics  that interact on a 
global scale by building a network of contacts and interdependencies that we call 
“trans-local”. This process is allowed by the combination of several factors, from 
international trade to the advancement of communication technologies and the 
activation of transnational solidarity networks that are being built around the 
claim of human rights. Added to this are the flows of images produced by the 
culture industry, the emergence of a polycentric policy, the global perception of 
risk, especially with respect to environmental sustainability and to the danger of 
intercultural conflicts. 
In this context, the concept of democracy is questioned at least in its liberal-
formalistic conception. As some scholars observe, as far as the number of 
democracies in the world is steadily increasing (although still a minority), the 
effectiveness of democracy as a form of national political organization is openly 
questioned, while important areas of human activity are progressively organized at 
macro-regional and global levels (Held 1998, 11). Almost everywhere in the West, 
we are witnessing a crisis of the traditional mechanisms through which political 
representation has been built, accompanied by a more drastic separation between 
political classes and civil society. Electoral abstensionism, anti-politics and the 
emergence of new populist parties are some of the more visible indicators of these 
processes. Some social scientists have attempted to systematize these processes by 
coining also successful expressions, such as “post- democracy” (Crouch 2004) or 
“counter- democracy” (Rosanvallon 2006), in order to point out the risks as well 
as the implicit opportunities of the gradual rethinking of the concepts of politics 
and democracy. Together with a crisis of political representation, we are 
witnessing a growing capacity of civil society to mobilize through social 
movements and more or less formal networks capable of giving life even to forms 
of radical public protest, demonstrating a growing demand for politics and for 
more spaces of democratic action (de Nardis, Salento 2013; della Porta 2013). 
These dynamics allow us to reason about a possible reconceptualization of the 
conditions of democratic organization, both at national, sub-national and supra-, 
and trans-national levels. In order to do this, we need to briefly review the 
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different conceptions of democracy and then identify possible alternatives to the 
historically dominant tradition of liberal democracy. 
 
2. Four classical approaches to democracy 
Scholars often speak of democratic regimes as if democracy were a form of 
immutable political organization. We are convinced that describing democracy 
simply as a “regime” is restrictive, because it leads to formulate static definitions, 
resulting from a cognitive compromise between the democratic ideal and its actual 
fulfillment in different historical contexts. The result is a normative definition, 
preferred by lawyers and political scientists, which is inappropriate to the 
substantially “process-oriented” nature of the phenomenon. As Tilly writes, it is 
not useful to talk about democracy, but rather of “democratization”, seen as a 
dynamic process, always unfinished, and, above all, subject to reversibility. 
Consequently, any discourse of democratization should take the risk of a “de-
democratization” (Tilly 2007). 
The empirical analysis of democratic regimes is important to understand the 
process-oriented nature of the phenomenon. Although still a minority at the 
international level, the number of formally democratic regimes has increased in 
recent years; the fact remains that there are undeniable differences between 
consolidated democracies and newly established ones, just as there are differences 
between the various “historical” democracies. Adopting a dynamic criterion in the 
analysis of democracy can therefore help us to grasp the complexity of the 
phenomenon starting from an analysis of the conditions of democracy. What is 
needed in order to define a given regime as “democratic”? The concept of 
democracy is certainly connected to the guarantee of certain citizenship rights, 
meant as civil, political, as well as social rights. Undoubtedly, the strong link 
between civil liberties and political rights is fundamental to understand the topic 
of democracy. For example, the American association “Freedom House”, which 
monitors the levels of democratic development around the world, has developed 
several indicators of democracy related to the presence of specific civil and 
political liberties, related, inter alia, to the presence of an institutionalized 
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political opposition and of certain guarantees of individual freedom (Karatnycky 
2000). For their part, scholars of democracy have produced several definitions 
which generally reflect four distinct approaches to the problem (in this regard see 
della Porta 2013): 
a) “Constitutional approach”: In this case, scholars pay attention to 
the legal structure of a regime. From this perspective, we can historically 
distinguish between monarchies, oligarchies, republics, etc., as well as, in the 
context of democratic regimes, between constitutional and non constitutional 
monarchies, or between presidential or parliamentary republics and, again, 
between unitary and federal states. This approach has many advantages, but its 
drawback is that it does not distinguish between formal rules and habits, between 
“formal constitution” and “material constitution”. A political class can actually 
issue rules and then systematically disregard them. 
b) “Factual approach” (or substantive approach): In this case scholars 
pay attention to the living conditions of the citizens and the type of politics that is 
actually promoted. The central point lies in observing whether the system actually 
promotes the well-being of citizens, identified with a sufficient level of social 
equality, individual freedom and safety. The normative dimension compared to the 
concrete practices is of secondary importance, but some issues remain unresolved: 
for example, how do we measure the level of democracy in a very poor country, 
where a relative social equality is however provided, compared to a very rich 
country that presents higher levels of inequality? By adopting only a factual 
perspective, it becomes difficult to establish under what sociopolitical conditions 
we can actually promote social and individual wellbeing for citizens. 
c) “Procedural approach”: In this case scholars identify a set of 
governance practices by categorizing them as democratic or non-democratic. 
Attention is paid mainly to the mechanisms of voting. A regime is therefore 
democratic if it guarantees universal (male and female) suffrage in free electoral 
contests. Procedure-oriented scholars, therefore, conceive democracy as an 
“electoral democracy”, while neglecting other important dimensions related to the 
exercise of democratic freedoms. This makes it difficult to establish a difference 
with respect to the degree of democracy in countries such as the United States and 
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India, both electoral democracies, but clearly different in terms of the levels of 
well-being of their citizens. 
d) “Process-oriented approach”: In this case it is possible to identify a 
number of processes that must be activated in order to consider a political 
community as democratic. Robert Dahl, who is one of the most influential authors 
in the field of democracy, proposes five process-oriented criteria (Dahl 1998) 
“effective participation”, 2) “equality in voting practices”, 3) “right to 
information”; 4) “control on the political agenda”, 5) “universality of suffrage”. 
Dahl does not refer to norms, but to processes, by de facto producing an 
essentially static checklist, based on evaluations of presence/absence of certain 
democratic conditions, while preventing that leap in analytical quality, which is 
based on a real observation of the “degree of democracy”. 
Actually, to provide comparisons and explanations, we have to give up the 
logic of check-lists by identifying, on the contrary, some critical variables. 
Although the process-oriented intent of Dahl is laudable, he tends to fall into a 
static logic, by offering an ideal picture of the perfect democratic regime that, in 
broad terms, corresponds to the parameters of classical liberalism. 
 
3. The limits of liberal-democracy 
The different approaches described above converge substantially on a static 
definition of democracy linked to the liberal political tradition. In this regard, the 
model that scholars tend to identify with the so-called “modern democracy” is that 
of the democratic rule of law, or mass liberal-democracy. Yet, this is not the only 
possible form of democracy, but is undoubtedly the form consolidated in the West 
after the end of World War II. A liberal democratic regime is characterized by the 
real guarantee of political participation for all adults and by the possibility of 
dissent, opposition and competition within the political arena. 
Starting from this definition, scholars who use a procedural approach, such 
as Schumpeter (1942), refuse to assign any ethical connotation to democracy, by 
considering it simply a “method”, i.e., a tool to achieve political decisions, 
according to which individuals obtain the power to decide by means of a 
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competition that has popular vote as its object. Very similar, although more 
sensitive to values, is Sartori’s definition (1969, 105) – commonly accepted by 
political scientists – according to which democracy is an ethical-political system 
in which the influence of the majority is entrusted to the power of competing 
minorities that ensure it. From this definition emerges clearly the ethical 
dimension of democracy. It is therefore seen as a system of rules and values; yet, 
also in this case, Sartori offers a minimum procedural connotation, which binds 
democracy to the single dimension of electoral dynamics and of the delegation of 
power through the mechanisms of political representation.  
These two definitions, both related to a procedural conception, are 
compatible with the so-called minimal definition of democracy by which scholars 
identify a few empirically verifiable aspects which allow us to establish a 
threshold above which a political regime can be defined as democratic (Morlino 
2001). A regime can therefore be counted among the democratic systems when it 
presents certain characteristics: a) universal (male and female) suffrage, b) free, 
competitive, recurrent, and correct elections, c) more than one party, d) different 
and alternative sources of information. In this way, democracy is reduced to the 
ability to exercise a range of civil and political rights guaranteed by a set of 
formal rules. “Form”, thus, as a guarantee of “substance”. The objective of 
procedural democracy is to produce socially binding decisions through a system 
of certain rules that allow, through the exercise of an equal vote, to make 
decisions which would not compromise the systemic structure. Procedural 
democracy thus ensures an uncertainty about the content of the decision-making 
process, however guaranteed by the certainty of the rules. But in a liberal context, 
the decisional uncertainty finds a limit: in any case the democratic process cannot 
lead to the production of decisions that can undermine those that, from Locke 
onwards, have been considered the two cornerstones of classical liberalism: 
“private property” and “free market”. Having said this, it is clear that liberal 
democracy declined according to a procedural scheme assumes that there is at 
least a compromise on the basic rules, while accepting forms of dissent about the 
contents of this compromise. 
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Consequently, we can say that a liberal democratic regime is based on the 
political representation of interests. It is therefore a delegated democracy, in the 
sense that citizens delegate decision-making powers to a body of specialists who 
form the political class in the strict sense. Nevertheless, even liberal regimes may 
provide some form of “direct democracy”, such as referendums or laws of popular 
initiative. 
 
4. Democracy as democratization 
Together with Tilly (2007), we believe that we need to put forward a 
dynamic and process-oriented conception of democracy declined in terms of 
“democratization” and, at times, of “de-democratization”. In this regard, the 
starting point lies in the relationship between citizens – holders of a corpus of 
civil, political and social rights – and the state. The change in this two-way system 
of relations is the core of democratic development in a progressive or regressive 
direction. The dimension of the conflict between residents of a given territory and 
political authorities becomes central. The political classes have the task of 
translating social demands into policies, by transforming interests into rights. In 
this sense, the central role of politics is in the constant consultation with citizens 
about their needs. This means that citizens, in turn, must communicate to the 
political class their own demands, and this can be done through the voting 
practice, the only one that is really justified in a liberal democratic regime, or 
through other forms of collective action, such as those that take place in the 
protest dimension of social movements, or in the consensus-oriented dimension of 
the pressure groups. We should also consider the compliance levels of political 
authorities to the inputs that come from the citizens. A system will be more 
democratic when the political class makes decisions that are consistent with the 
citizens’ demands. In this case scholars speak of “responsiveness”, meaning the 
ability of political elites to meet social demands. So as to assess the level of 
democracy in a given country taking into consideration the political and 
institutional responsiveness is not enough, it is also necessary to provide an 
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answer, together with Tilly (2007, 13-15), to four basic questions corresponding to 
four analytical dimensions: 
a) How broad is the range of demands expressed by citizens? At this 
level we consider the “breadth” dimension, i.e., the number of citizens who are 
actually allowed to ask questions to the political system. The more democratic is 
the system, the broader the number of individuals who enjoy citizenship rights, 
i.e., civil and political rights. 
b) How impartial can the conduct of the State be towards the demands 
coming from citizens? At this level, we configure the dimension of “equality” 
within the different categories of citizens. The less discrimination against certain 
social (ethnic, religious, gender, class, etc.) groups the more democratic the 
system is. 
c) To what extent the expression of social demands receives adequate 
political protection by the state authorities? At this level we indicate the 
dimension of “protection”, which varies with the repression that the state enacts 
against certain social groups. A system is more democratic when all citizens enjoy 
the same level of protection on the part of the institutions. 
d) To what extent the process of political translation of social 
demands engages both the citizens and the state? At this level we finally set the 
dimension of the “mutually binding consultation”, which is much more 
democratic when citizens and institutions comply with specific obligations both in 
the formulation of social demands and in their possible translation into public 
policies. If, on the one hand, citizens must resort to forms of corruption, threats, or 
violence to obtain benefits and, on the other hand, the state is sensitive to these 
practices, the system cannot be described as mature in terms of democratic 
practices. 
According to the four analytical dimensions proposed by Tilly, a regime is 
democratic to the degree that political relations between the state and its citizens 
“feature broad, equal, protected and mutually binding consultations”. From this 
point of view, the “democratization” of the system presupposes a general shift 
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towards a broader and more equal consultation (universality of citizenship rights), 
which should be increasingly protected and mutually binding. On the contrary, we 
can speak of “de-democratization” when a reverse shift occurs. If, as it has been 
said, “breadth” and “equality” have to do with the guarantee of the main 
citizenship rights, then “protection” will be connected instead to the so-called 
“state capacity”, i.e., the effective capacity of political institutions to implement 
decisions, by protecting citizens from possible abuses on the part of 
administration officials or other non-political entities. Actually, either an 
extremely low level or an excessively high level of state capacity may inhibit 
democracy. This is because, in the first case, the state would not have the strength 
to adequately protect the citizens. Similarly, in the second instance, there would be 
the risk of a state so strong and decisive as to overwhelm mutually binding 
consultations. The optimal dimension is therefore the intermediate, with a neither 
too high nor too low state capacity, in which state agents are able to intervene in 
the resources and non-state activities, without neglecting exchange relations with 
the citizens. 
 
5. Liberal-democracy challenged 
So far we have considered a form of democratic organization that is 
achieved in the procedures of mass liberal democracies, based mostly on universal 
suffrage and the logic of representation. But, as Eder notes (2010, 246), 
democracy is a permanent process of definition and redefinition, which may 
change over time in the process-oriented logic in which we have showed our main 
interest. Moreover, liberal democracy is not the only possible form of democracy. 
It is precisely in those countries where it was first conceived and established that 
today liberal democracy is criticized both theoretically and in social practices. The 
West has been long witnessing a weakening of the degree of social legitimacy of 
the institutions of representative democracies.  
We have several indicators of this phenomenon, from the increasing levels 
of electoral abstentionism to the emergence of many populist and anti-system 
political parties and movements. This crisis of the functioning of liberal 
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democratic institutions is accompanied by a structural crisis of the traditional 
organs of participation and political organization, beginning with mass parties, 
ideologically and organizationally weakened and less able to aggregate and 
translate the multiplicity of social interests into policies. This phenomenon brings 
back some theoretical objections to representative democracy, which although 
historically dominant, has always been accompanied in its development by other 
conceptions. A number of phrases are used to define liberal democracy: 
“participatory democracy” (Pateman 1970; Polletta 2002), “strong democracy” 
(Barber 2004), “communicative” or “discursive democracy” (Young 1996), to 
quote just a few possible theoretical alternatives to the classical definition of 
liberal democracy. All these conceptions are based on a criticism of the logic of 
delegated democracy, and focus on the need to create opportunities for conflict 
and, therefore, direct political participation and socially shared spaces of public 
deliberation. Basically what varies is the perspective from which the role of 
“interests” is observed, where and how they are formed and their modes of 
aggregation and organization. 
As Donatella della Porta notes (2010; 2011, 15), in the intense debate on the 
normative theory of democracy we can identify two subtly problematic 
dimensions: first, the construction of identities and interests as an exogenous (i.e. 
external) or endogenous (i.e. internal) democratic political process, and second, 
the existence, or the lack, of conflict as a fundamental dimension of the political 
process. By crossing the two dimensions we can identify four ideal models of 
democracy: liberal, participatory, liberal-deliberative participatory-deliberative.  
 
a) In a “liberal democratic” model, identities develop outside the 
political process, and are conceived in the forms of representation. It presupposes 
intermediate bodies (the parties) that aggregate the interests and translate them 
into public policies in the seats of institutional representation. While accepting the 
polyarchic logic of a plurality of socio-political preferences, in a liberal context a 
substantial consensus on a range of interests compatible with the system is 
assumed, identifying a potentially dysfunctional element in the social and political 
conflict and in the forms of participation that it involves. 
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b) “Participatory democracy” is the first theoretical challenge to 
liberal democracy, in recognizing the multiplicity of social conflicts and the need 
for a broad involvement of the citizens in the political process beyond election 
time. The participatory approach to democracy presupposes a substantial 
separation between social contradictions and political translation, thus assuming a 
formation of the identities and interests as an exogenous political process. 
c) “Liberal-deliberative democracy” is a variant of the classical 
liberal-democratic conception. Those who look at democracy in this perspective 
emphasizes the dimension of the endogenous formation of identities and interests 
in the democratic process. Special attention is paid to the process of formation of 
interests within the institutions, refusing, however, the majoritarian logic of liberal 
democracy according to which the process should always end with a vote that 
divides citizens into majorities and minorities. More than on the output of 
decision-making, the emphasis is therefore on the discursive potentialities of the 
democratic process, which is based on a face-to-face debate on the different 
options. This open discussion can result in an encounter and then in the 
transformation of these preferences into the discursive process. 
d) “Participatory-deliberative democracy” is the result of the 
combination of the two main criticisms of classical liberal democracy, 
“participatory” and “deliberative” democracy. In this case democracy is intended 
as a space of conflict and a meeting place between alternative preferences that are 
processed and transformed into the discursive exchange of views within the 
democratic institutions. The “public sphere” is here conceived as the perfect place 
for conflict between different identities and experiences that are transformed in 
the process of conflict/debate within the system. 
 
The classical model of liberal democracy proves to be partially inadequate 
to face the challenges of a constantly changing world, so much so that some 
scholars have thought about a possible post-democratic phase (Crouch 2004) 
determined by the substantial weakening of all the major institutions of the 
representative system in liberal democracies (parliaments, political parties, 
separation between economics and politics, etc.). The explosion of the processes 
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of globalization, the increasing pressure of the markets on national policies, the 
partial weakening of the exercise of state sovereignty, the emergence of a vibrant 
civil society that refuses to be channeled into the conventional forms of 
participation, at national, sub-national and transnational levels, require a reflection 
on possible – at present mostly theoretical – alternatives to the traditional forms of 
sociopolitical organization. We will now reflect in depth on “participatory 
democracy” and on the two versions of “deliberative democracy” that are 
differently eligible to replace or complement the traditional mechanisms of liberal 
democracy. 
 
6. The challenge of participatory democracy 
Since the second half of the twentieth century, many scholars have 
highlighted the theoretical inadequacy of a democratic conception, which sees the 
social and political conflict as a dysfunctional element in the organization of an 
orderly system. Critical of the “dogma of representation”, supporters of a 
conception of participatory democracy lay the emphasis on “participation” and 
“conflict” as elements of democratic revitalization. Participatory democracy calls 
into question the liberal principle of delegation and argues for the importance of 
informed and conscious citizens who are directly involved in decision-making, 
enjoying a substantial equality of condition. The inevitable oligarchic 
degeneration of representative democracies is criticized, by laying claim to the 
classical conception of popular sovereignty exercised through broad and inclusive 
political participation (Costa 2010, 9). 
Proponents of participatory democracy consider the involvement of citizens 
as fundamental, regardless of the electoral moment (Arnstein 1969; Pateman 
1970; Barber 2004). As Pateman observes, all citizens should be granted so many 
spaces of action as there are spheres of policy-making in a context of full 
participation, therefore understood as the process in which each individual 
member of the decision-making process has equal power in determining the 
outcome of decisions (Pateman 1970, 70-71). As Arnstein observes, along the 
same line, citizen participation is a categorical term of citizen power; citizens 
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should be granted free access to information aimed at direct decision-making 
action, without necessarily bet on their liabilities in favor of professional 
politicians (Arnstein 1969, 216). Participation has also the function of having 
citizens socialize with the values and institutions of democracy conceived as a 
collective action for the common good. Participation becomes a “school of 
democracy” that produces stimuli to social activism and mutual trust (Barber 
2004, 152). This dimension of civic education emerges strongly from research on 
social movement activists who, in the course of their action, show that they can 
transform themselves by feeding on participatory democratic virtues emerged 
from this action (Szas 1995, 154). 
Democratic participation becomes the instrument of the working classes for 
the redistribution of resources and values within a society. Participatory 
democracy is first and foremost a social conception of politics that is based on the 
need for free expression of conflicts in the collective practice for equality. In this 
sense, according to Donatella della Porta (2011, 57-58), it has many elements in 
common with the conceptions of “associative democracy” (Hirst 1994) and 
“radical democracy” (Laclau, Mouffe 2001), which emphasize the practices of 
social self-organization also in replacement of some state functions, focusing on 
the need for an “agonistic democracy” as a way of peaceful management of 
conflicts between opposing interests (Mouffe 2005, 20). 
Therefore, the contentious and participatory dimension becomes clear in a 
theoretical framework that emphasizes the separation between social and political 
space. Conflicting interests and collective identities take shape in the social arena 
and then they are funneled into participatory political processes. 
 
7. The challenge of deliberative democracy 
The criticism of liberal democracy by classical theorists of deliberative 
democracy, in both its liberal and participatory variants, is different and somehow 
more complex. The two variants share the emphasis on the transformation of 
preferences in the course of a discursive process (Drysek 2000a). In both 
concepts, therefore, there is the assumption that “interests” and “identities” are 
Challenges to Democracy and the Opportunity of a New Participatory Governance in the era of 
trans-local societies 
 
85 
formed and transformed in the political process, challenging those notions of 
democracy that are based on the political need to aggregate interests that are 
exogenous to the system (Freschi, Raffini 2010; Raffini 2010, 49). 
In a context of pluralism, deliberation becomes the only form of democratic 
legitimacy of socially binding decisions (Cohen 1986; Manin 1987). The principle 
of “integration” within the democratic process replaces the principle of 
“aggregation” of interests. The two deliberative perspectives – liberal and 
participatory – differ in the way they consider the conflict, which is inhibited in 
the first case, and emphasized in the second, and the different idea they have of 
the identification of the “natural” place of deliberation: whereas in liberal 
deliberation the deliberative-discursive process is achieved in the unstructured 
frame of a public sphere that is far from power relations (Habermas 1962), in 
participatory deliberation the same process takes place in the contexts defined by 
a well-organized and often protest-oriented civil society (Dryzek 2000b). 
a) The "liberal-deliberative perspective" focuses on the comparison 
between rational individuals who are convinced of the strength of the better 
argument to reach a political decision, within a consensual logic. The central point 
lies in arguments and discourse. Within this logic, participants in deliberative 
processes convince each other, reaching shared decisions (Gutmann, Thompson 
2004). Deliberation is accomplished through horizontal communication flows 
where individuals, as carriers of a variety of content, exchange their opinions, 
showing a strong willingness to listen. According to Dryzek (2000b, 64), 
deliberative or discursive democracy is a dispassionate, logical, reasonable kind of 
communication. The emphasis on the conflict between private interests disappears 
and these are discursively connected to the general interest (Cohen 1989). 
The liberal-deliberative conception has its roots in the work of Jürgen 
Habermas, who comes to elaborate a normative theory of democracy from a 
critique of the instrumental rationality that characterizes the modern era 
(Habermas 1962, vol. 1984; 1992 vol. 1996). He distinguishes three “worlds” 
which correspond to different forms of rational action: 1) the “objective world” of 
the events, 2) the “social world” of the rules, 3) the “subjective world” of 
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dialoguing people, or “life-world”. The first world is the one where instrumental 
rationality and a form of goal-oriented rational action, that is a “teleological” 
action, prevail; in this context individuals relate to the outside world in order to 
manipulate it. The second world is one in which a normative order, and hence a 
form of rule-oriented rational action, prevails; in this context, individuals act 
conforming to the cultural expectations of their social group. The third world, on 
the other hand, is the place of the symbolic achievement of individuals, where a 
“dramaturgical” action prevails, conveyed by social interactions as on a theater 
stage; in this context, a form of discursive rationality, as opposed to mere 
instrumental rationality, can prevail, giving rise to forms of agreement-oriented 
communicative action. “Ethics of discourse” and “communicative rationality” are 
the basis of the model of democracy based on deliberation. In this way, Habermas 
proposes a way out of both the liberal model of democracy and the republican and 
communitarian models. If, in the first case, citizens come together in a collective 
dimension as separate individuals with distinct interests, in the second, 
individuality and ethical community come together in the one dimension of 
general interest. The third way suggested by Habermas represents an attempt to 
integrate individual autonomy and social integration: “The dichotomy individual-
society finds a conciliation by which the inter-subjective dimension of 
communication between individuals acquires centrality, in terms of 
communicative rationality that becomes the medium of integration” (Raffini 2010, 
56). The procedural model of deliberative democracy developed by Habermas is 
therefore based on the need to institutionalize the argumentative processes in the 
context of a public sphere made up of a “rational public” (Habermas 1992). 
  Starting from this premise, Habermas proposes a two-track deliberation: 
on the one hand, we have the formation of opinions in the context of a public 
sphere separate from the state; on the other, we have the time of decision-making 
that takes place through institutionalized mechanisms (representative assemblies). 
The autonomous public sphere becomes an essentially anarchic communicative 
space in which to perceive new problems outside the institutionalized channels of 
mainstream media. It becomes the place of human emancipation in a context of 
broad participation, and according to an actual agreement-oriented conversational 
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approach. Public opinion and political decision remain two separate processes that 
take place in autonomous contexts, respectively the “public sphere” and the 
“state”. 
b) The “participatory-deliberative perspective” combines participation 
and deliberation in the context of substantial equality and social inclusion, starting 
from a criticism of the bourgeois public sphere developed by Habermas. It calls 
into question the existence of a single public sphere within which the opinions 
would be expressed. On the contrary, there exists a “plurality of publics” that 
compete with each other in an often confrontational way. Several “counter-
publics” dispute the truth of the “bourgeois public” (Fraser 1997, 75). The first 
aspect that differentiates between liberal and participatory deliberation is, 
therefore, the importance accorded to the conflict between worldviews that take 
shape in the context of distinct and opposing public spheres. Workers, women, 
ethnic minorities have historically created their own discursive arenas, by 
developing counter-discourses as opposed to those used in the bourgeois public 
sphere. From here emerges a further criticism of liberal-deliberative democracy 
that, with Habermas (1992, vol. 1996), postulates a dual process, where an 
informal and extra-institutional deliberation influences institutional decision-
making processes. It therefore neglects the activation of deliberative processes 
that take place outside the institutional dimension in the practices of movement 
and within groups of volunteers (Cohen 1989; Dryzek 2000b). According to this 
logic, the real deliberation, one that gives life to the democratic process, is 
achieved even and especially in contexts that are free from institutional power 
through participatory actions by citizens organized in associational networks. Also 
in this case, the discursive logic is fundamental, yet it is supplemented by the 
logic of protest: the processes of committed and responsible participation include 
demonstrations and sit-ins, music and comic books, with the same right as 
parliamentary speeches (Young 2003, 119). Liberal deliberation deems social 
inequalities irrelevant, whereas, participatory deliberation places social 
inequalities at the core of the process of conflict. Without attention to the actual 
extent of inequality, however, also the discussion in deliberative contexts risks 
reproducing the oligarchic logic of representative democracy, by denying the 
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oppressed groups the ability to learn the rules of the game thanks to which the 
deliberative process can be truly horizontal (Young 2000, 156). 
Participatory deliberation can be achieved only in an environment of 
equality, inclusion and transparency within physical arenas of discussion and 
deliberation in which all those who are potentially interested can rationally argue 
their preferences in view of the common good (della Porta 2005). Through this 
opposition to hierarchies, in the emphasis placed on grassroots participation, 
participatory-deliberative democracy has become the favorite formula of 
participation and decision of the new social movements. It is no coincidence that 
the main institutional experiments in deliberative democracy has been made under 
the pressure of grassroots movements, thus determining a qualitative evolution of 
the traditional form of participatory democracy, as well as of governance models 
adopted in modern representative democracies (Gbikpi 2005; della Porta, Gbikpi 
2008; Freschi, Raffini 2010; Fourniau, Tafere 2010). 
Among these new deliberative practices, the best known is probably linked 
to the experience of “participatory budgets” launched in Brazil at the beginning of 
the nineties and subsequently tested in Europe at the level of local governments 
(Allegretti, Campos, Suqueira 2010). The aim of participatory budgeting is to 
enable all citizens to take part in the definition of the municipal budget through 
the construction of local deliberative assemblies and working groups where 
proposals of public spending are formulated. The municipal government is 
committed to translate all the proposals into policies. To avoid the risks of 
delegation and self-exclusion, others have experienced the construction of 
statistically representative samples of the population to be entrusted with the task 
of deliberation (Sintomer 2007). In this way also the most isolated and ordinary 
citizens have access to the decision-making process in a logic of sociological 
representativeness. Others have experienced the so-called deliberative polling 
(Fishkin 1991) designed to insert moments of structured deliberation in liberal 
regimes. The polls are carried out by aggregating a random sample of citizens, and 
enabling them to inquire and discuss about specific issues upon which they are 
then called to act. In other cases, there is a recourse to the formation of citizens' 
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juries, involving from time to time a relatively small number of individuals, 
selected according to a criterion of sociological representativeness. In still other 
cases, several forms of electronic deliberation have been experimented, by 
exploiting the potential of the digital network (Hančič 2010). Although interesting 
and somewhat effective, all these experiments in deliberative democracy have not 
been exempt from criticism (Raffini 2010, 68-69), and have often accused of not 
being able to rid the decision-making process from the hierarchical and 
manipulative control by institutions. Anyway, these experiments can be seen as 
important attempts to revitalize democratic conditions, and more than often, they 
do not come from within the institutions, even if they are ultimately accepted at 
the institutional level under the influence of civil society organizations and protest 
movements (de Nardis 2003; della Porta 2007; 2009a; 2009b). 
 
8. Citizenship debated  
The concepts of “democracy” and “democratization” are connected to that 
of “citizenship” making reference to the original condition of an individual's 
membership in a political community and, in modern times, in a state (Janoski, 
Gran 2002), therefore, to a territorial dimension today challenged by the pressures 
of trans-locality. The level of democratization of a political community depends 
on the “extension” of citizenship. The wider the number of individuals who have 
the right to be citizens, the more democratic a country is. A truly democratic 
regime must accept the concept of “enlarged citizenship”, by guaranteeing civil 
and political rights to all citizens, regardless of social categories and/or cultural 
affiliations. Even modern constitutional states of the nineteenth century 
presupposed recognition of the rights of citizenship to their populations, although 
bound to census or gender. In the West, universal suffrage without distinction of 
gender and social origins was recognized only in the second half of the twentieth 
century. Even today, not all individuals living in a given territory enjoy political 
rights; an example is provided by immigrants (also called “stranger citizens”) 
who, while living and working in a particular territory, in many states do not have 
the opportunity to participate in decision-making through the exercise of voting 
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rights. These people represent an increasingly large portion of citizens, since the 
transnational mobility of individuals is now a structural aspect of the 
contemporary world. This shows that citizenship was invented to “include” but, as 
Wallerstein points out, everything that includes, often ends up excluding 
(Wallerstein 1998), by establishing a boundary between those who have the right 
to be part of a community and those who don’t. Therefore, the concept of 
citizenship seems to be is at least two-dimensional (Gargiulo 2008): it makes 
reference to the set of rights and duties assigned to an individual or group and, at 
the same time, to their membership in a political community. Not all those who 
belong to a state can enjoy the so-called rights of belonging and not all those who 
live in a state belong to it legally. 
With respect to civil and political rights, scholars use to distinguish between 
a “passive citizenship” and an “active citizenship”. We can trace the origin of this 
distinction in the work of Sieyes who, in the middle of the French Revolution, 
proposed the distinction between passive and active rights: in the first case, he 
referred to the main civil liberties (freedom of speech, equality before the law, 
freedom of the press, etc.), in the second, to the possession of political rights 
(especially the freedom to vote). He came to the conclusion that all the inhabitants 
of a country should be able to enjoy civil rights (passive citizenship), but not 
anybody should necessarily enjoy political rights thus becoming active citizens 
(Sieyes 1789, 193-194). The concepts of passive and active citizenship have now 
taken on a different meaning related to the recognition and exercise of political 
rights. Today, by passive citizenship we refer to the legal possession of certain 
rights (both civil and political). By active citizenship, instead, we refer to the 
effective exercise of those rights, that is the real participation of citizens in the 
political life of the community they belong to. Therefore, this distinction reflects 
the difference between “citizenship as status”, passively acknowledged by the 
citizens, and “citizenship as a social practice”, determined by the active 
participation of the citizens in the building of the community they belong to. If 
passive citizenship is essentially an object of study for historians and jurists, 
active citizenship is of special interest in the empirical social sciences, because it 
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assumes the enactment, based on the enjoyment of certain rights, of a set of 
observable social behaviors. 
The concepts of “passive citizenship” and “active citizenship” recall in part 
the original distinction between a liberal conception of citizenship (Schuck 2002), 
still prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon countries, and a republican conception of 
citizenship (Dagger 2002), more rooted in continental Europe, especially in 
France. In the first case, there is the prevalence of a legal-formalistic vision; 
whereas in the second case, the vision is more substantive (or substantialistic). 
Liberal citizenship focuses on the rights of (civil and political) freedom for 
individuals, whilst republican citizenship puts the emphasis on “community” and 
on the civic duties that citizens have in it. According to republican 
communitarianism, a good society is built by the collective action for the common 
good. In the first case, citizenship is broadly understood as the protection of 
individuals by the arbitrary power of the state, by emphasizing the individuals’ 
right to pursue their private interests. In the second, the emphasis is placed instead 
on organized civil society working for the community without selfish ends (Sau 
2004, 99). 
As Danilo Zolo observes, the liberal concept of citizenship is primarily 
attributable to the first Continental legal formulations, focusing on the status of 
citizen (as distinct from the foreigner) who has been associated with a set of 
passive rights. In the second case, formal rights become a lever for collective 
political action, thus assuming a connotation of clear interest for sociology and 
political science (Zolo 1994). This “sociological citizenship” focuses on political 
participation for the collective good; it no longer refers only to the set of civil and 
political rights, but it also conceives of democratization as a place of gradual 
extension of the main social rights, related to welfare institutions. 
Problems of space prevent us to dwell on the various historical paths to 
citizenship and, in particular, to democratic citizenship (see Zincone 1992; Isin 
and Turner 2002; de Nardis 2013). What interests us here is how to renew a 
discourse on democracy and citizenship in an era of evident social de-
politicization due to some phenomena on which we cannot dwell now, but that 
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literature has identified in the process of gradual transnationalization of social and 
political relations and in the radicalization of the process of financialization and 
the parallel de-politicization of the economy. 
The term “citizenship” is often superimposed on that of “nationality”, yet 
the two concepts are related although analytically distinct. On the technical-legal 
point of view they reflect two different frameworks: The concept of “citizenship” 
has been largely confined to a domestic dimension so far, while the issue of 
“nationality” is often addressed in international law. Citizenship, as a theoretical 
concept, describes the relationship between an individual and a community, since 
it represents “cohesion” in a world subject to a radical “fragmentation” 
(Rubenstein 2004, 4; McMahon 2012). From this point of view, in order to be still 
effective, citizenship should be disengaged from the domestic dimension to which 
has historically been bound. Though it is related to the concept of communitarian 
membership, it is essentially linked to the ability, granted to individuals, to 
influence a system of power, thus taking part in the decision-making process. But 
governance is today realized through a set of processes that, as a result of 
globalization, occur regardless of the size of the national states and are influenced 
by several (both public and private) social actors within which there are 
individuals who, although not enjoying the status of citizens in a given territory, 
are able to act and influence their government. In such an environment, citizens 
within a state see their ability to control the political community in which they 
live radically reduced. National citizenship, therefore, undergoes a crisis by 
imposing a reflection on the need for a transnational (or post-national) 
reconfiguration of the same concept (Sassen 2003), connected to a rethinking of 
democratic governance. In a sense, the idea of a post-national citizenship is 
already present in some attempts to build state-transcending governmental 
organizations on the model of the European Union, according to a logic of 
“transborder participatory democracy” (Ichiyo 1993; Rubenstein 2004). In our 
opinion, the most interesting attempt to conceptualize this new course is provided 
by scholars who, starting from David Held, propose the construction of a 
cosmopolitan democracy. 
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9. The proposal of a cosmopolitan democracy 
If democratic deliberation, especially in its participatory variant, can be a 
useful tool against the risks of oligarchic degeneration of the institutions of liberal 
democracy, since it is capable of integrating the logic of representation and the 
logic of contentious participation, it is at the level of local government that it 
shows its real effectiveness, exposing the essential aspect of political direction of 
the processes of globalization, as emerged from the above reflections on the 
concept of citizenship. The node to be solved is that of global democratic 
governance, since to date, there is no official authority that controls the states’ 
action in the world system, but there are also several non-official actors that affect 
its operations and policies (Russett and Star 1996, 62). 
In this sense, it can be interesting to think about the model of cosmopolitan 
democracy proposed by David Held. The finding of the risks inherent in the 
processes of transnationalization of politics and economy leads Held to think 
systematically about the meanings and models of democracy (Held 1987). 
Globalization actually limits the ability of states to take binding decisions on 
important political and economic issues, which are mostly left to the free, and 
somehow uncontrolled, action of politically non-accountable actors. This requires 
us to think about a redefinition of democratic standards on a global scale. If states 
become too small to be able to act in the world arena on an independent basis, it 
becomes important to reason on the existence of a political system that goes 
beyond the size of states, which may reproduce, nonetheless, the dynamics of 
legitimacy and accountability of modern national politics. If non-state actors have 
the right to participate in political life and contribute to the definition of decision-
making within the states, it is necessary to develop an institutional apparatus also 
at an international level, which may include the different subjectivities that have 
been taking the whole world as a context of reference for years. The 
interconnection between states and international organizations has undermined the 
logic of liberal representative democracy, so that today the decisions of an 
institution like the International Monetary Fund (IMF) may have a significant 
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impact on national policies, although without any democratic legitimization. 
According to Held (1995a; 1995b; 2009), it is necessary to take measures through 
institutional reform on a global scale, starting from a political strengthening of the 
United Nations, the only international organization with a potentially democratic 
structure. At the same time, he proposes the creation of regional parliaments (like 
the European Parliament) and the identification of measures of cosmopolitan 
democracy such as international referendums and a world assembly capable of 
producing legal norms. 
He proposes a solution to the absence of a world state based on the 
assumption that democracy needs an institutional framework that guarantees the 
rights of citizenship. For example, today different actors (intergovernmental 
organizations, non-governmental delegations of the United Nations, individual 
states, social movements) are involved in the issue of human rights, even if they 
do not enjoy any institutional recognition. The issue can be addressed not by 
placing the state at the core of the reflection, but individual actors in their direct 
relationship with international organizations and NGOs. In a cosmopolitan 
democracy, the global order is divided into multiple networks of power globally 
involved in issues of general interest, such as health, rights, environment, peace, 
knowledge, economy, in a context where groups and organizations enjoy a fair 
autonomy based on the principles of “cosmopolitan democratic law”, articulated 
for each field of action of the social, political and economic spheres. These 
principles would be granted and legitimized by parliaments and courts (such as 
the European Parliament and the Court of Justice) connected to the supranational 
level. Therefore, Held proposes to reconsider the nature of sovereign state 
authority, by observing some internal and external “disjunctures”. In the first case, 
he refers to the disjuncture that is created between the formal domain of national 
governments and the concrete practice that today gives body to regional, national, 
and local economic and political systems (Held 2000, 319). In the second, he 
detects a friction between the claims of governments to determine their own future 
and the world economic system (in addition to many international organizations 
and institutions that act on a daily basis to influence the activities of the states). In 
this regard, he proposes four external disjunctures: 
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a) A disjuncture related to the world economy that determines the 
tension between production system and state authority. Two aspects are relevant in 
this context: the internationalization of production and the internationalization of 
financial movements organized by corporations. Today national institutions, 
sovereign only within a specific territory, have difficulty in producing public 
policies that are binding for these great actors of the world economy. 
b) A disjuncture related to the role of international organizations 
precisely designed to control transnational activities. These are international 
political structures that influence the states on specific policies, such as the 
Universal Postal Union, the International Telecommunication Union, the World 
Meteorological Organization and other similar, often more influential, bodies, 
such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the world Trade 
Organization (WTO), and the European Union (EU) itself. 
c) A disjuncture related to international law, which – although with 
poor incisiveness so far - can influence the behavior of individuals, states and 
NGOs, usually gathering in general declarations signed intergovernmentally, as in 
the case of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the European 
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
International law is made up of a set of rules that establish the basis for an orderly 
system of international cooperation. 
d) A disjuncture that Held (ibid., 325) calls “hegemonic powers and 
power blocs” that often undermine the autonomy and political-institutional 
integrity of states. Let’s consider, for example, the post-war conflict between the 
U.S. and USSR and their respective spheres of international domination, but also 
the quasi-imperial role still claimed by the United States. 
In addressing the potentially fragmented and undemocratic nature of these 
developments, Held (ibid., 327) proposes the use of a “federal model of 
democratic autonomy”, where the concept of autonomy serves to articulate the 
foundation of consent as the sole principle of legitimacy and limitation of 
sovereign power. The fact that individuals should enjoy equal rights and duties 
implies the sharing of a single structure of action that will enable them to pursue 
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an individual and collective project. A double process of state reform and 
reorganization of civil society would be necessary in order to achieve this goal 
(Held 1989). A dual process of democratization around the principle of democratic 
self-government that can be operationalized worldwide by building a stable 
relationship between networks of states and networks of civil society, which may 
make reference to institutional centers of authority. 
 
10. The opportunity of global participatory governance 
The model of cosmopolitan democracy is undoubtedly ambitious in that it 
presupposes an agreement between the states on an institutional reform that, by 
strengthening the powers of international governmental organizations (primarily 
the UN), may formalize a substantial transfer of sovereignty to supranational 
institutions. At the same time, such a “federalist” model is able to combine the 
need for a political government of transnational social processes and the need to 
identify forms of legitimacy of governmental bodies through the construction of 
participatory-deliberative arenas. In the model of cosmopolitan democracy, 
therefore, international civil society would play a central role, thus becoming a 
key player in decision-making processes. 
The first complaints against the ambiguities in the functioning of the world 
political system emerge precisely from those networks of social movement that, 
since the nineties of the twentieth century, have challenged the undemocratic 
nature of some international governmental organizations, by proposing a global 
reform in a democratic and participatory direction (de Nardis 2003; 2005; Held 
and McGrew 2007; della Porta et.al. 2009). The wealth of research on the 
movement for global justice has shown the great demand for democratic politics 
on the part of these movements. The individual activists interviewed during the 
various European Social Forums were mostly cohesive in their willingness to put 
their trust in those supra-national political institutions capable of combining 
efficient decision-making and democratic consultation of the people organized 
into multiple social networks. It is no coincidence that the highest levels of trust 
were put in the United Nations, but also in another possible political Europe (de 
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Nardis and Alteri 2006), expressing a sort of “critical cosmopolitanism”. It is 
evident that the weakness of liberal democracy at the supranational level requires 
an urgent redefinition of global governance built around public arenas of 
participatory and deliberative democracy (della Porta 2007, 110). The presence of 
an international civil society that sees the world as a participatory horizon has 
become a fact that the international political classes have to take into account 
(Shaw 1994; Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001). In the last decades, the number 
of International Non-Governmental Organizations (INGOs) has exponentially 
grown along with the so-called transnational social movement organizations 
(TSMOs) that are now able to exert pressure and influence on various levels of the 
international decision-making processes (Princen and Finger 1994, 1; Sikkink and 
Smith 2002; Held and McGrew 2007, 35). From this point of view, as Talberg and 
Uhlin observe (2011, 212), the deliberative quality of the actors of the global civil 
society can contribute to the emergence of a global public sphere (see also Alteri 
and de Nardis 2011) required for the definition of global democratic governance. 
The project of democratic development within and beyond the states 
presupposes the existence of global institutions that give individuals the status of 
“inhabitants of the world” as a part of a post-national conception of citizenship. In 
this direction, the institutions of a new global democracy should give voice to 
social issues without considering the territorial and national belonging of 
individuals (Archibugi 2003, 8). This aim requires the immediate implementation 
of some important reforms involving a strengthening of the United Nations and 
the abolition of the veto power that some superpowers in the Security Council 
enjoy today. We need to find the necessary formulas to give greater power to the 
representatives of the countries in the developing world. It would be important to 
implement some democratic practices in the international system, such as 
transnational referendums on issues of particular relevance. We need to build an 
international army which can be really liable towards the United Nations. It is also 
necessary to assume the existence of a parliamentary assembly with consultative 
powers (on the model of the European parliament) and identify intermediate 
spaces of deliberation within which non- governmental social organizations can 
play a decisive role. 
Fabio de Nardis 
 
 
98 
The objective difficulty to proceed in this direction cannot, however, 
absolve the international political classes and social scientists from concretely 
reflect on the need for a world government that may meet the characteristics of a 
deliberative and participatory democracy. 
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